Civil War, We WISH It Were A Civil War

Here is the PDF of the key judgments of the NIE on Iraq. Much of it is familiar, but it has the weight of authority.

• Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006.

• Decades of subordination to Sunni political, social, and economic domination have made the Shia deeply insecure about their hold on power. This insecurity leads the Shia to mistrust US efforts to reconcile Iraqi sects and reinforces their unwillingness to engage with the Sunnis on a variety of issues, including adjusting the structure of Iraq’s federal system, reining in Shia militias, and easing de-Bathification.

• Many Sunni Arabs remain unwilling to accept their minority status, believe the central government is illegitimate and incompetent, and are convinced that Shia dominance will increase Iranian influence over Iraq, in ways that erode the state’s Arab character and increase Sunni repression.

• The absence of unifying leaders among the Arab Sunni or Shia with the capacity to speak for or exert control over their confessional groups limits prospects for reconciliation. The Kurds remain willing to participate in Iraqi state building but reluctant to surrender any of the gains in autonomy they have achieved.

• The Kurds are moving systematically to increase their control of Kirkuk to guarantee annexation of all or most of the city and province into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) after the constitutionally mandated referendum scheduled to occur no later than 31 December 2007. Arab groups in Kirkuk continue to resist violently what they see as Kurdish encroachment.

They described four wars right there. Not many people realize that there's a vote scheduled for Kirkuk this year. After the 3 votes in 2005, the Iraqis learned that ethnic identity and share of the vote are an exacting correlative. So the Kurds are going about cleansing Kirkuk of Turkmen. Call it the Iraqi version of "canvassing neighborhoods." And if they succeed, the urge will grow stronger in Turkey to intercede directly through invasion.

Here's the key of all the key judgments.

The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.

A civil war has two sides. This is at least a Rubik's Cube and perhaps a 20-sided die (these analogies prove I grew up in the 80s and was a dork). And surging troops and drawing up new security plans isn't going to help. Hell, there's been one in place since the beginning of the year (and January has historically been a slow month) and more civilians have been killed than ever before.

Then there's this strawman argument thrown right in the middle of this thing:

Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.

If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries—invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al-Anbar province—to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.

I want them to define the term "rapid". Because every responsible redeployment plan I've seen, from Feingold's to Kerry's to Obama's to Murtha's, calls for this process to play out over several months and even years. Nobody's asking for a complete vanishing from the scene; obviously there would still be support but not the central role we have now. The other thing about this is that it doesn't define how this is the most likely scenario no matter when forces leave.

In addition, all of their recommendations for how the situation could possibly change are based on political factors:

•Broader Sunni acceptance of the current political structure and federalism to begin to reduce one of the major sources of Iraq’s instability.

• Significant concessions by Shia and Kurds to create space for Sunni acceptance of federalism.

• A bottom-up approach—deputizing, resourcing, and working more directly with neighborhood watch groups and establishing grievance committees—to help mend frayed relationships between tribal and religious groups, which have been mobilized into communal warfare over the past three years.

They're all about as likely as Rush Limbaugh winning the Nobel Peace Prize he was bogusly "nominated" for. There is no political will for any managed solution, because there is no leadership concerned with reconciliation.

Finally, there's this line which should be kept in a lockbox and pulled out by the Democrats at every opportunity.

Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics.

Sure, there's this little dance afterwards about how Iran is supporting certain select Shia groups, but that's the take-away. The hawks are trying to bully everyone into thinking the problem with Iraq is Iran, and that's simply not the case.

What the NIE paints is a picture of slowly unfolding horror, and the last place on Earth where more American troops should be sent. This overdue report, which should have been made available before a new course was charted for Iraq, makes very clear that our military has nothing left to do in Iraq and that the process of military disengagement, combined with rapid regional diplomatic engagement, must begin.