The Iraqi Security Forces

This is really the problem in Iraq.



We are simply not getting the Iraqi security forces in a position where they can provide for their own security. And really, we never will. The chart shows minor progress over the last several years, particularly in creating independent security teams.

So four years into this thing, how are we doing in getting Iraqi army units up to speed? Answer: at the beginning of the year we had 15 Level 1 (fully independent) units. Today we have 12. Level 2 units have gone from 78 to 83. Some progress.

We don't even know if we WANT to arm and train these security forces, which we've frequently seen can turn sectarian and run the risk of arming militias who will eventually take up those arms against their American trainers and their ethnic opponents. We go back and forth with mission shifts. Now we're back to training the Iraqi forces. And it's not working.

All of this points to the fact, as I've heard again and again and again, that if it remains true that the day American troops leave Iraq, the country will collapse, no matter how long we stay, then we might as well leave now, because all you're doing is wasting lives and treasure. And since four years have passed with that exact same dynamic in place, and the Iraqi security forces have essentially stagnated in the same position, I believe a gradual withdrawal within 6-9 months is the least worst option.

And let's be completely clear: David Petraeus was in charge of training the Iraqi security forces. He was very upbeat and positive about them 3 years ago. And it simply cannot be the case that ONLY the bombing of the Golden Dome in Samarra derailed that process. The longtime wingnut mantra on this war is that things were going just perfectly in early February 2006 until that bombing. This is months after the "last throes" comment, months after Cindy Sheehan's summer in Crawford, months after John Murtha called for withdrawal because of how bad it was getting. Furthermore, it conveniently tosses down the memory hole a year and a half of brutal sectarian violence, a lot of it CARRIED OUT by those Iraqi security forces, particularly the police, who under Petraeus' leadership became a Shiite militia. The facts do not support such revisionist history.

Both Robert Menendez and Bob Casey have hit Gen. Petraeus on this today, and his response to this is literally that the Iraqi forces are taking a lot of casualties and that's why they haven't progressed. So that's an argument for exposing them MORE to the fight? If after four years of not being in the fight at all, they cannot conduct any independent operations, their capability to take them on after being in the lead cannot possibly be somehow better. This is really the endgame in Iraq. The entire underpinning of the strategy in Iraq is not credible. There is no end, only worry about chaos if we don't stay and keep the cork in the bottle, and that's probably by design.

The talk in Washington on Monday was all about troop reductions, yet it also brought into sharp focus President Bush's plans to end his term with a strong U.S. military presence in Iraq, and to leave tough decisions about ending the unpopular war to his successor.

The plans outlined by the U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus, would retain a large force in the country -- perhaps more than 100,000 troops -- when the time comes for Bush to move out of the White House in January 2009.

The plans also would allow Bush to live up to his pledge to the defining mission of his presidency, and perhaps to improve his chances for a decent legacy. He can say he left office pursuing a strategy that was having at least some success in suppressing violence, a claim that some historians may view sympathetically.

"Bush has found his exit strategy," said Kenneth M. Pollack, a former government Mideast specialist now at the Brookings Institution. As Petraeus met with lawmakers and unveiled chart upon chart showing declining troop levels, the U.S. commander seemed to have opened a new discussion about how the United States would wind up its commitment to Iraq. Yet viewed more closely, his presentation, and that of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, were better suited to the defense of an earlier strategy: "stay the course."

And I'll take it a step further and suggest that the exit strategy goes right through the Democratic Party. When the Iraqi force proves unable to replace the American forces, the country will likely descend into a chaos that will be blamed on the Democratic President sitting in the White House at the time. Bush will be brush-clearing and giggling.