Sadr, Badr, Big Difference, Right?

This could be the start of something big.

BAGHDAD - Radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has blamed the United States and the Iraqi government for the death of a senior aide in the holy city of Najaf.

The cleric's office issued a statement in which al-Sadr promises he won't "forget this precious blood" but he urges his followers to "be patient."

Friday's statement comes hours after Riyadh al-Nouri was gunned down as he drove home after attending prayers. Al-Nouri was the director of al-Sadr's office in Najaf.

You can only anger the head of the most powerful populist movement in Iraq so many times. Sadr is being cautious because he has morphed into something of a statesman (at least that appears to be the perception in Iraq) over the last couple years, and taking the high road works for him. Eventually he won't have to; and he can say he was "dragged" into the conflict. This is the movement that routed the Iraqi security forces in Basra. It is dormant only in the way that a sleeping giant is dormant.

Of course, stateside we get a very Manichean view of things, where Sadr is the enemy and the Maliki forces are on the side of the righteous. Matt Duss and Brian Katulis demolish that argument.

Speaking before Congress, General Petraeus said, "Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way through its lethal support to the special groups," referring to Shiite splinter groups allegedly receiving support from Iran. According to the general, the recent clashes between Shiite groups stretching from Basra in the south all the way to Baghdad "highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called special groups."

Conservatives such as Sen. John McCain, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, have latched on to this incomplete description of the ongoing intra-Shiite struggles in Iraq as the latest reason why our over-stretched military forces must remain in Iraq [...]

These depictions ignore an inconvenient truth: The leaders in Iraq's current government are closely aligned with Tehran and represent some of Iran's closest allies in Iraq. This is perhaps best illustrated by the warm welcome Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad received in his visit to Iraq last month, which punctures the myth that the current battle is between a unified Iraqi government and fringe groups receiving support from Iran.

There is little doubt about who is Iran's primary proxy in Iraq: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. This leading Shiite faction, now a key member of the ruling coalition in Iraq's government, was founded in the early 1980s by exiled Iraqi clerical activists in Iran, with the blessing and support of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The Quds Force, a special branch of the ayatollah's Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, created and trained the supreme council's armed wing, the Badr Corps, for the express purpose of eventually serving as an arm of the Quds Force in Iraq. The supreme council was among the Iraqi exile parties with which the U.S. worked in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, even though it maintained close ties to Iran. And the Iraqi Shiite faction continues to receive Iranian funds.

And now, the Badr forces essentially make up the backbone of the Iraqi police and Army. We once again have armed, trained and supported bad actors who will not remain loyal because we paid them off. Amazing how the concept of blowback remains so foreign to this Administration. Or rather, remains so foreign with respect to Iraq; in Afghanistan we're starting to figure this one out.

NATO commanders in Afghanistan have decided to end local police training, fearing that cops in remote areas -– most of whom once fought for tribal warlords –- might one day turn their weapons against Kabul and the U.S.-led coalition.

The change in policy perhaps signals a shift in Western attitudes towards the growing ranks of sanctioned tribal armies that perform routine security functions in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The “Sons of Iraq” militia groups, in particular, are a key facet of the U.S. strategy for preventing extremists from taking root in vulnerable Sunni communities.

But some military officers have questioned the long-term wisdom of arming sectarian groups whose allegiances are notoriously fickle.

Of course, we're still arming sectarian groups inside Iraq, in fact on both sides of the sectarian divide, with the Badr Brigades inside the security forces and the "Sons of Iraq" Sunni Awakening groups outside. We are sustaining and furthering an eventual inter-sectarian civil war.