The Organization Gap

The difference between the way the Obama campaign and the McCain campaign is approaching the general election couldn't be more stark, and for once, we have the professional operation.

Obama is locking down cooperation with the DNC, moving its operations to Chicago, and involving itself in coordination with the state parties, ensuring a very smooth and cohesive message in the general election as opposed to having everybody fight with one another, the way it was in 2004:

You may recall that the DNC chair in 2004 was one Terry McAuliffe, and in his book, McAuliffe wrote about the back-stage infighting between the DNC and Kerry camps. McAuliffe said that Kerry's aides had wanted to oust him; that relations were chilly throughout the campaign; and that the Kerry camp muzzled him when he wanted to assail George W. Bush's military record.

By contrast, upon securing the nomination, Obama very quickly put out a statement showering praise on Howard Dean; is now moving to put staff in all 50-states, in concert with Dean's approach; and is quite literally moving swaths of the DNC to Chicago to create a unified organization with the sort of party-wide message discipline that has eluded Dems in the past.

This is streamlined, cost-efficient and offers massive potential for a cross-platform message, with the grassroots and the top-level campaign on the same page.

And then there's McCain's operation. Gerson's op-ed has the usual conservative crap, but I almost can't believe this part.

The style and approach of general election campaigns are often conditioned by the method of victory in the primaries. The Obama team ends the season like a battle-worn Army division -- organized, relentless and skilled at fundraising, registering voters and getting them to the polls. Members of the McCain team feel more like survivors of a near-death experience -- convinced that the virtues of their candidate and the blessings of the political gods matter more than the money, phone banks and door-knocking of traditional politics.

This worries some Republican strategists. One recently described the McCain campaign to me as the political equivalent of a Mickey Rooney and Judy Garland movie: Every morning a few guys get together and say, "Let's put on a show!" McCain's state campaign organizations, coalition outreach and get-out-the-vote efforts are weak or nonexistent. But McCain campaign officials are convinced that they will win -- if they win -- in a different manner from that of the methodical Bush campaigns of 2000 and 2004. McCain will either catch fire, or he won't -- and traditional efforts to boost turnout, in this view, are not likely to make the difference. Given its history, the McCain campaign is understandably proud of its stripped-down, seat-of-the-pants, insurgent style. But it may eventually be useful to have a serious campaign organization in, say, Colorado.

He literally has no national campaign apparatus. It's the ultimate in arrogance, a reflection of the man who is dismissive of his opponent as unable to step on the same stage as him. He really thinks his personality and war service will just set everyone running toward him, without having to work at it whatsoever. His predecessor at least had the sense to get out of the way and let Karl Rove run the campaign operation. McCain is the C+ student who blows off the test and goes out to drink in the parking lot.

He's going to try and skate on his reputation and hope his BBQ-stained friends in the media get him into the White House. Organization is for sissies.

This guy's gonna get clobbered.