Major Developments On Ending The War In Afghanistan

I apologize in advance for disrupting close reading of the election, but we have something pretty large breaking in one of the most dangerous trouble spots on the globe, an area of the world where we have already sunk hundreds of billions of our treasury and too many lives. There seems to be a split between the Taliban and Al Qaeda that a smart nation would exploit and use to ensure a responsible withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Spencer Ackerman has the details:

President Karzai is said to have demanded that the Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, publicly renounce bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, as a condition for further talks. A Taliban representative took this demand to Mullah Omar in his hideout in Afghanistan and returned to Mecca with a positive answer, according to a source familiar with the talks.

Holy shit! Think of the disruption that a public split with the Taliban would cause al-Qaeda. So much of al-Qaeda's propaganda is built around its indomitable-and-rugged-warrior-of-faith image. But if the Taliban, who fit that bill much better than does AQ, goes for a separate peace, then that's not something bin Laden recovers from. Imagine the contortions in a bin Laden videotape as he explains why Mullah Omar, his friend and patron of nearly 15 years, was never a true Muslim. In the eyes of jihadists, UBL would appear isolated, desparate and fanatical.

So what do the Taliban want?

Mullah Omar has sent the Saudis a list of seven demands of his own, according to this source. Among the items on the Taliban agenda are a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan; a role for Taliban representatives in provincial and national government; assimilation of Taliban fighters into the Afghan army; and amnesty for guerrillas who fought against the United States.

I don't relish the prospect of negotiating with the Taliban. Their reign was a human rights disaster and their harboring of Al Qaeda monstrous. But if they are seriously willing to talk, we have to consider it. They control large swaths of the country and hold far more influence than the national government. Isolating Al Qaeda is a noble goal, as is delivering the role for disrupting the terror network to local law enforcement and intelligence. The terms Mullah Omar is seeking are not completely satisfactory, but it's a starting point.

The US appears serious about these negotiations as really the only endgame strategy in Afghanistan:

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. is actively considering talks with elements of the Taliban, the armed Islamist group that once ruled Afghanistan and sheltered al Qaeda, in a major policy shift that would have been unthinkable a few months ago.

Senior White House and military officials believe that engaging some levels of the Taliban -- while excluding top leaders -- could help reverse a pronounced downward spiral in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. Both countries have been destabilized by a recent wave of violence [...]

The idea is supported by Gen. David Petraeus, who will assume responsibility this week for U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Gen. Petraeus used a similar approach in Iraq, where a U.S. push to enlist Sunni tribes in the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq helped sharply reduce the country's violence. Gen. Petraeus earlier this month publicly endorsed talks with less extreme Taliban elements.

These talks have already started between the Karzai government and the Taliban, and we would do well not to disrupt them. Furthermore, starting talks does not mean ceding to the Taliban on every point - their presence in a coalition government can be framed as a choice between peace and future hardship. I think if there's legitimate isolation of Al Qaeda remnants, it's a price worth paying - of course Pakistan has to play a role there. This at least gives a glimmer of hope that there's some manner of endgame here.

What Petraeus understands and the White House doesn’t — or, at least, up till now didn’t — is that insurgencies rarely end with complete victory by one or the other side. They end by co-optation, integration and — yes — appeasement. Give your enemy a positive reason to stop fighting you that meets his core needs and you can probably get him to, you know, stop.

Making an offer like that will, most often, allow the population to view you as reasonable, putting the insurgent in a bind if he refuses. And the hardcore insurgents who refuse reasonable offers of peace can be dealt with militarily. That’s why Petraeus went to Heritage earlier this month, as I reported, and said, “You have to talk to enemies”:

Petraeus pointed to efforts by Hamid Karzai’s government to negotiate a deal with the Taliban that would potentially bring some Taliban members back to power, saying that if they are “willing to reconcile,” it would be “a positive step.”

The key to all of this is to put an end to our involvement in what is casually known as the "graveyard of empires." There is no "win" in Afghanistan without a buy-in from all the local forces, and right now, the Taliban is a major part of that. We can go down the road of trying to vanquish them, but we've lost seven years of time, and the population is not at all thrilled with the idea of another long war. The Taliban is growing more sophisticated in their attacks (they shot down a US helicopter yesterday) and more powerful in the countryside. We cannot force an occupation on the Afghan people any more than we could force one on the Iraqis.

Furthermore, with a new Administration coming in, the military beyond broke and the Treasury even more so, a clean and honorable exit from Afghanistan would be deeply sought and welcomed. If we can change our strategy, find out what can best serve the whole nation and our interest in seeing Al Qaeda unable to continue operations, that's a major win for everyone. Less air raids on the heads of Afghan civilians would help, too. Assuredly, it's a lot easier to fix a global economic crisis when you're not carrying two wars on your back.

There has not been a lot of hopeful moments in the Afghanistan conflict over the past several years, but this is certainly one. It's a moment that an Obama Administration cannot afford to let go. Negotiate - and find an end to these occupations.