Cornering The Market On Bipartisanship

Shorter John McSame: the key is to trap the troops:

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, seemed to give a thumbs down to bipartisan legislation that would greatly expand educational benefits for members of the military returning from Iraq and Afghanistan under the GI Bill.

McCain indicated he would offer some sort of alternative to the legislation to address concerns that expanding the GI Bill could lead more members of the military to get out of the service [...]

Officials in charge of Pentagon personnel worry that a more generous and expansive GI Bill would create an incentive for troops to get out of the military and go to college.

And while that might be great for the individual troop, it could be bad for the military, which is already under stress after more than five years fighting two wars.

On his campaign plane this afternoon, McCain said he and allies in the Senate are working on an alternative to the bill, but would only support something that included incentives to stay in the military.

"We are working on proposals of our own  I'm a consistent supporter of educational benefits for the men and women of the military," McCain said. "I want to make sure that we have incentives for people to remain in the military as well as for people to join the military. ... I've talked a lot about veterans' health care, so we'll continue to talk about those issues and how to care for vets. I know I can do that, having been one."

This sets up the false choice that we can either give troops the educational benefits they deserve or have a military that isn't broken. Quite a few people enter the military for the educational benefits anyway, so an expanded GI Bill would help on the recruitment side, which is just as important as retention. Second, McCain's proposal is premised on the idea that you should make it virtually impossible to leave the military, forcing the economically disadvantaged to re-up. Republican policies have already made civilian life a struggle for the lower and middle classes; this is a proposal to break the trust of promising aid in exchange for national service. It's a symbiotic relationship that made this nation the most prosperous on Earth in the 1950s.

The way to repair the broken military is by leaving Iraq, not by holding current troops hostage by lessening their prospects in civilian life, or bribing mercenaries in foreign countries to sign up. And education benefits is not some sort of handout like welfare.

"We owe them something," Flavin said of his comrades. "They've given life, limb, everything there is to give. The people who bore the most pain and suffering are the people who could use these benefits."

McCain's figuring that he's going to need more soldiers for all those wars he's planning to start while in office. A military that makes good on its promises and is only used when absolutely necessary, after all, wouldn't be in Iraq. But what this shows, in the final analysis, is that the only "bipartisan" solutions that matter to McCain are his own solutions.

Two sources (neither at Common Cause) who spoke on condition of anonymity told me about McCain's attempts to remove former president of Common Cause, Chellie Pingree, from her job. Common Cause, a non-partisan group devoted to open government, was in some ways the field operative for McCain-Feingold in the Senate. But soon, according to my sources, Pingree saw that this regulatory scheme was too full of loopholes; in particular, she realized that it would lead to too much confusion about what various sorts of organizations could do or not do.

Like many others at the time, Pingree concluded that straightforward public financing was the answer. This wasn't what McCain wanted to hear. In an effort to remove Pingree, McCain's operatives made phone calls to Common Cause board members, funders, and anyone else they thought they could persuade or intimidate. McCain's efforts failed, but they showed that he was willing to attack an ally the moment her judgment veered away from his own [...]

One point to add to Cliff's account is that the line that McCain's agents took in trying to oust Pingree was that she had hurt the organization's "bipartisan credibility." Yet what constituted a loss of bipartisan credibility? It was McCain alone. If McCain was happy with the organization, they could call themselves bipartisan; if he turned on them because they didn't follow his agenda, they lost their bipartisan cover, because even if there were other Republicans who supported reform, he occupied the entire space. This was a staggering amount of power for one politician to have over an organization that was meant to be a watchdog on politics, and McCain used that power ruthlessly.

This is where I lost my admiration for McCain. And as I've watched McCain's modus operandi on other issues, such as the torture legislation, I've continued to see echoes of the Common Cause episode: Corner the market on bipartisanship. Move to claim the position of bipartisan intermediary, and then use that position ruthlessly to serve his own purposes or sell out his allies, because they are dependent on the reality or perception of bipartisanship. As a study in the art of exercising power, it's quite impressive. Until people see through it.

This works when you have a power center and are in demand. It's less effective when you're running a partisan campaign. Those bipartisan allies on military issues won't be bullied into supporting his vision of the GI Bill. Bipartisan allies on the environment know that McCain is shamelessly pandering to voters by calling for a gas tax holiday that would increase driving and greenhouse gas emissions. Bipartisan allies on campaign finance reform won't look kindly upon his campaign manager making the rounds of top lobbyists in DC. McCain's perception as a bipartisan leader will fade with these continued policy shifts, and he will morph into the picture of the current figurehead of the Republican Party.

Big-Spendin' McCain Update

So the DNC's complaint to the FEC is clearly getting under John McCain's skin. Leading to this ludicrous framing: that ripping off American taxpayers is a civil rights issue:

...Potter said the Supreme Court concluded that public financing for campaigns is constitutional because it is voluntary. "As a result, candidates have a constitutional right to withdraw from the program."

Of course, the problem is they've already USED the program. They used the money to get ballot access in Ohio and Delaware (Here's the relevant proof from Ohio, and the one from Delaware). They used the money in the public system to get a bank loan. There is no known Constitutional right that I know of for using public money and then pretending you didn't.

So in addition to the "Because I said so" defense, McCain is going to have to get an FEC ruling. Only the FEC only has two commissioners on it, due to a jam caused by Hans von Spakovsky's nomination and the unwillingness by Senate Republicans to decouple his confirmation from the other three broadly acceptable commissioners-in-waiting. Keep in mind that the DNC could actually file suit to force compliance on this. So John McCain may have to rely on Mitch McConnell to save his Presidential campaign. Which puts McConnell, who has been public enemy #1 on campaign finance issues, in a unique position.

This puts the Dems in a strong position--by denying the FEC a quorum, they can deny McCain the ability to get out of matching funds. They don't have to do anything except continue to refuse to consider all four nominated commissioners a hearing together; so long as they continue to insist that von Spakovsky receive his own hearing, things won't move forward.

Unless Mitch McConnell budges on his insistence that all the commissioners receive a hearing together.

But here 's the thing. Mitch McConnell (whom I'd include among those GOP bigwigs whose support Mitt would get before threatening to un-suspend his campaign) hates John McCain. Absolutely hates him.

In fact, I'd say that McConnell is one of the most likely sources for the Iseman story in the first place. After all, the first piece of evidence to counter McCain's denials was McCain's deposition in McConnell's suit against the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law (BCRA is one of the reasons McConnell hates McCain so much). The deposition was given to McConnell's attorney in that suit, Floyd Abrams. While the deposition is publicly available, it is likely that someone pointed Isikoff to it. If so, I'm guessing that someone is rather closer to McConnell than he is to McCain.

Meanwhile, the good government reform groups have taken a complete pass on McCain's dirty effort to rip off taxpayers. Public Citizen (the group founded by Ralph Nader) is even offering testimony on McCain's behalf. This is nuts.

I've alluded to this with subtle jabs, but it's time to come out and say it clearly: There are a set of groups in Washington identified with the cause of campaign finance reform that seem to sit up at night staring at a picture of John McCain and waiting for the phone to ring. The four-year affair that ended with passage of the McCain-Feingold legislation banning soft money was the high point of their lives (to their credit, it was quite a political achievement -- still the only piece of legislation enacted over the objections of a majority of Republicans and the misgivings of Bush) but at this point, especially after the (entirely predictable) Supreme Court decision striking down its restrictions on television ads, McCain-Feingold doesn't amount to more than a memory.

This unrequited loyalty not only apparently gives McCain a free pass on abuses such as the loan; it has allowed him to essentially dominate the field, without lifting a finger. McCain's monopoly, as the only Republican interested in reform, gave him incredible power over the agenda (pushing purely restrictive policies, such as the proposed restrictions on political bloggers in 2005, and on non-profits the previous year) and leverage over the organizations, whose support from foundations depends on being bipartisan. This "McCain Wing" of the campaign finance reform movement is led by Democracy 21 and the Campaign Legal Center, both generally admirable and adept organizations, with small staffs and significant influence on the Hill and with reporters and editorial writers. The largest campaign finance organization, and the only one with real members, Common Cause, has been gradually moving beyond the cramped, restrictive view of reform represented by the McCain wing toward a more open approach, with great internal angst -- a longer story than can be told in a blog post!

Matt Stoller has more on Common Cause's legacy of failure. These so-called Democratic allies simply have not properly understood the current political climate and have hampered efforts at progressive change over and over. The single-issue groups have to adapt to remain relevant. And part of that is recognizing the big picture rather than keeping loyalty to Republicans who offer little more than lip service to them.

UPDATE: I forgot: McCain's other defense of his actions was to whine "B-But Howard Dean did it too," always my favorite Republican excuse for lawbreaking - "but it was widespread lawbreaking!" And in this case, it's not true, and Dean has the primary evidence. The bottom line is that Dean didn't take out a loan with public money used as collateral, and he didn't use the public system to save millions in ballot access fees.