Financial Reform FAIL And A New Metric For Recessions

Simon Johnson had the same problem as I did with the President's speech on financial reform:

As a diagnosis of the problems that let us into financial crisis, it was his clearest and best effort so far. He didn’t say it was a rare accident for which no one is to blame; rather he placed the blame squarely on the structure, incentives, and actions of Wall Street.

But then he said: our regulatory reforms will fix that. This is hard to believe. And even the President seems to have his doubts, because he added a plea that – in the meantime – the financial sector should behave better [...]

Louis Brandeis, of course, would have seen things differently. The author of “Other People’s Money: And How The Bankers Use It,” was under no illusions concerning the underlying financial power structures and how they operated. He would have regarded an appeal to the better nature of bankers as somewhere between humorous and sad.

The only thing that will make a different is regulation. This is the lesson of the 1930s in the US – the regulations imposed at that time created a financial sector that did not impede growth after World War II; basic intermediation (connecting savers and borrowers) worked fine and destabilizing frenzies were avoided. During this period, the financial sector came up with venture capital, ATMs, and credit cards – arguably the three most important financial innovations of the past 100 years, and much more helpful of real innovation than anything you’ve seen since 1980.

As Johnson has repeatedly argued, we need to break up the biggest banks, end the revolving door between Wall Street and Washington and ensure that the executives taking the risks put their own fortunes at stake instead of gambling with our money. Sadly, none of these elements exist in the more modest reform proposals from the President, and even those are faltering in the face of institutional pressure.

As a result, we muddle through, resetting the clock to the pre-bailout days without having fundamentally fixed the system or prevented the possibility of a relapse. It's great that Ben Bernanke thinks the recession is over. But the 9.4 million people who have lost their jobs would disagree with him. Their personal depressions continue, and I would argue that this is a direct result of allowing the titans of Wall Street trillions in Treasury wealth while ordinary Americans suffer with a too-small stimulus and not much prospect for recovery.

Fifteen million Americans are locked in the nightmare of unemployment, nearly 10 percent of the work force. A third have been jobless for more than six months. Thirteen percent of Latinos and 15 percent of blacks are out of work. (Those are some of the official statistics. The reality is much worse.)

Consider this: Some 9.4 million new jobs would have to be created to get us back to the level of employment at the time that the recession began in December 2007. But last month, we lost 216,000 jobs. If the recession technically ends soon and we get to a point where some modest number of jobs are created — say, 100,000 or 150,000 a month — the politicians and the business commentators will celebrate like it’s New Year’s [...]

At some point the unemployment crisis in America will have to be confronted head-on. Poverty rates are increasing. Tax revenues are plunging. State and local governments are in a terrible fiscal bind. Unemployment benefits for many are running out. Families are doubling up, and the number of homeless children is rising.

It’s eerie to me how little attention this crisis is receiving. The poor seem to be completely out of the picture.

Joseph Stiglitz has a similar view in today's Guardian, arguing that the Administration through saving the financial system has perversely created banks that are not only too big to fail but too big to resolve, the way you would other entities which cannot meet their obligations. In a separate piece, he argues that the metric for evaluating recession - gross domestic product - now has almost no bearing on everyday lives, and ought to be scrapped in favor of something that truly reflects the outlook for ordinary people.

The big question concerns whether GDP provides a good measure of living standards. In many cases, GDP statistics seem to suggest that the economy is doing far better than most citizens' own perceptions. Moreover, the focus on GDP creates conflicts: political leaders are told to maximise it, but citizens also demand that attention be paid to enhancing security, reducing air, water, and noise pollution, and so forth – all of which might lower GDP growth.

The fact that GDP may be a poor measure of well-being, or even of market activity, has, of course, long been recognised. But changes in society and the economy may have heightened the problems, at the same time that advances in economics and statistical techniques may have provided opportunities to improve our metrics.

I remember Andy Stern coming up with the same idea in his book a few years ago. If we continue to use a metric based on the desires of elites, then they will please themselves with growth results even though the mass of people continue to suffer. Believe it or not, common statistics can actually change policy for the better. The problem lies in getting everybody to use it.

...Kevin Drum offers up real median income growth as a better metric. If that's the case, we've actually been in a depression for a decade.

A Year After Lehman

A year ago, Lehman Brothers collapsed, sparking a financial meltdown that nearly took the global economy with it. The problem, as many saw it, concerned giant banks taking huge risks and putting greed ahead of responsibility. The solution, one year out, has been to stuff those giant banks with money to prop them up, while making them bigger and allowing them to take exactly the same risks.

One year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the surprise is not how much has changed in the financial industry, but how little.

Backstopped by huge federal guarantees, the biggest banks have restructured only around the edges. Employment in the industry has fallen just 8 percent since last September. Only a handful of big hedge funds have closed. Pay is already returning to precrash levels, topped by the 30,000 employees of Goldman Sachs, who are on track to earn an average of $700,000 this year. Nor are major pay cuts likely, according to a report last week from J.P. Morgan Securities. Executives at most big banks have kept their jobs. Financial stocks have soared since their winter lows.

The Obama administration has proposed regulatory changes, but even their backers say they face a difficult road in Congress. For now, banks still sell and trade unregulated derivatives, despite their role in last fall’s chaos. Radical changes like pay caps or restrictions on bank size face overwhelming resistance. Even minor changes, like requiring banks to disclose more about the derivatives they own, are far from certain.

Coming on the same weekend as the 11th-hour bailout of the giant insurer American International Group, and the sale of Merrill Lynch, Lehman’s failure was the climax of a cataclysmic weekend in the financial industry. In the days that followed, nearly everyone seemed to agree that Wall Street was due for fundamental change. Its “heads I win, tails I’m bailed out” model could not continue. Its eight-figure paydays would end.

In fact, though, regulators and lawmakers have spent most of the last year trying to save the financial industry, rather than transform it. In the short run, their efforts have succeeded. Citigroup and other wounded banks have avoided bankruptcy, and the economy has sidestepped a depression. But the same investors and economists who predicted, and in some cases profited from, the collapse last fall say the rescue has come at an extraordinary cost. They warn that if the industry’s systemic risks are not addressed, they could cause an even bigger crisis — in years, not decades. Next time, they say, the credit of the United States government may be at risk.

First Alan Greenspan, and then Ben Bernanke, have offered the biggest forces in the financial industry a "put" - a price at which they will bail out investors for any risky asset they manage to buy. Asset prices have been artificially inflated by the threat of collapse and the overriding principle of "too big to fail". In fact, Lehman is seen by many in the halls of power as an EXAMPLE of too big to fail - as their collapse triggered a crisis, the decree was made that such a collapse can never happen again.

And so we have the big firms growing even bigger. And the level of risk they take on basically the same, although leverage is a little bit reduced (maybe 15:1 instead of 25:1). And the regulatory structure is largely unchanged. The same regulators are accumulating even more power despite having missed all the signs of collapse a year ago.

Here’s a novel thought. Instead of creating more regulations to try to prevent this kind of mess from recurring, why not figure out how to hold regulators accountable when they perform as poorly as they did in recent years?

Edward J. Kane, a professor of finance at Boston College and an authority on the ethical and operational aspects of regulatory failure, has some ideas about how to do this and right our damaged system in the process. He outlined them in a recent paper titled “Unmet Duties in Managing Financial Safety Nets.”

This ugly financial episode we’ve all had to live through makes clear, Mr. Kane says, that taxpayers must protect themselves against two things: the corrupting influence of bureaucratic self-interest among regulators and the political clout wielded by the large institutions they are supposed to police. Finally, he argues, taxpayers must demand that the government publicize the costs of efforts taken to save the financial system from itself.

What we have now is the same self-interested power brokers holding control over the financial industry, and a federal government which has plugged its fingers in the dike, from which they are reluctant to let go lest disaster strike again. The industry has been weaned on these tremendous public investments and become used to them. The exit could be painful and I'm not convinced that the overall industry even welcomes it. They've got a pretty good thing going - the profits get privatized, the risk gets socialized.

To the extent there is a recovery, the President deserves a little credit. Yet he is rapidly squandering the opportunity to truly recast the financial industry into their traditional role, as facilitators of the flow of capital but not hoarders of it. The crisis point was a natural time to make the necessary changes to the system, not after that feeling of crisis has lifted and the Masters of The Universe are playing with house money again. Politically, it gives the sense that the bailouts were simply a handout to industry instead of an exchange of help in the near term for wide-ranging fixes in the long term. The President took to Wall Street today to argue for financial regulatory reform, but it's going to be difficult to get this through while the banks have all the leverage. He's going to say that normalcy cannot lead to complacency. He's going to say that the rules must be tightened to ensure that we never again subsidize the casino that has become Wall Street. That includes a Consumer Financial Protection Agency to protect those who buy mortgages and take out credit cards. It includes reining in derivatives and leverage. It includes accountability for the credit ratings agencies who got their job completely wrong because their incentives were allied with the same interests who sold the crap. It includes the ability to wind down banks that are too big to fail, making them too big to exist.

I'm pessimistic that all of this will actually happen, though. A year after Lehman, it feels like the time for reform has passed. And that's extremely dangerous for the nation.

Too Bigger To Fail

We were told during the financial crisis that the consolidation of the banks presented a situation where they had to be saved. Now we have the resultant outcome, that the banks which managed to survive the crisis are even bigger.

The crisis may be turning out very well for many of the behemoths that dominate U.S. finance. A series of federally arranged mergers safely landed troubled banks on the decks of more stable firms. And it allowed the survivors to emerge from the turmoil with strengthened market positions, giving them even greater control over consumer lending and more potential to profit.

J.P. Morgan Chase, an amalgam of some of Wall Street's most storied institutions, now holds more than $1 of every $10 on deposit in this country. So does Bank of America, scarred by its acquisition of Merrill Lynch and partly government-owned as a result of the crisis, as does Wells Fargo, the biggest West Coast bank. Those three banks, plus government-rescued and -owned Citigroup, now issue one of every two mortgages and about two of every three credit cards, federal data show.

A year after the near-collapse of the financial system last September, the federal response has redefined how Americans get mortgages, student loans and other kinds of credit and has made a national spectacle of executive pay. But no consequence of the crisis alarms top regulators more than having banks that were already too big to fail grow even larger and more interconnected.

FDIC head Sheila Bair is quoted in this article at least sounding concerned about this. Nobody else seems to be.

The American consumer will pay the biggest price for this, by the way. Not just in terms of having to bail out the few remaining banks if things get rough, but in higher fees and charges that accompany less competition.

I'm out, I'm going to a credit union from now on.

"Too Big To Fail" To Fail?

Over the weekend, the White House either released a new part of their regulatory plan or got the AP to bite at its larger intent - that they seek the end of "too big to fail" institutions that threaten to take down the entire economy.

They are the biggest of the big — the Citigroups, the Goldman Sachses, the AIGs and other financial behemoths. The Obama administration doesn't want so many around anymore.

Financial regulations proposed by the president would result in leaner and simpler institutions that don't carry the weight of the system on their marble columns [...]

So far, however, congressional debate has centered on the administration's plan to put the Federal Reserve in charge of these "systemically significant" companies. Less attention has focused on the potential effect on the institutions and the financial system's hierarchy.

Under the administration's proposal, companies such as Citi, Goldman Sachs and others in a broad top tier engaged in complex transactions would face stricter scrutiny and have to hold more assets and more cash as cushions against a downturn.

They also would have to anticipate their own demise, drafting detailed descriptions of how they could be dismantled quickly without causing damaging repercussions. Think of it as planning their own funerals — and burials.

Obama's plan, in short, aims to make it far less appealing to be so big. That was the middle ground the administration sought, a step short of an outright ban on systemically risky companies.

This sounds like a return to the behavioral economics mode that Obama wanted to push going into the White House - in effect, he wants to nudge big institutions from getting so large and interconnected that they must be kept on life support. The rules described here aren't entirely specific, but it sounds like the biggest companies will need to lower their leverage and increase their capital requirements as they grow.

Some believe that eliminating "too big to fail" is impractical. And those beliefs should be taken seriously. But even those critics believe that the way to do it is through capital requirements and leverage. So this is pretty much on the right track.

Now, if the White House takes this advice from the President of the New York Fed, we'd have something.

The Federal Reserve should break with past policy and try to identify and deflate asset bubbles before they can damage the U.S. economy, New York Federal Reserve President William C. Dudley said.

While interest-rate policy may not be the appropriate tool for popping bubbles, Fed officials have "other instruments in their toolbox," Dudley notes in the text of a speech scheduled for July 26 at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. The New York Fed released his remarks yesterday.

The Fed's view has been that bubbles can be identified only in hindsight, and that all the central bank can do is prepare to clean up after they burst. The current crisis shows that policy is mistaken, Dudley said.

"Asset bubbles may not be that hard to identify," he said. "This crisis has demonstrated that the cost of waiting to clean up asset bubbles after they burst can be very high."

Dudley did not specify what tools the Fed should use. Analysts have suggested that central bankers might raise reserve requirements or amp up restrictions on margin lending.

Simon Johnson links approvingly but wonders if the Fed can actually meet this task.

Of course, if the Fed can’t get better at spotting bubbles, the implication is that no one can. Which means that “macroprudential regulator” is just a slogan – a nice piece of what Lenin liked to call “agitprop”.

And if macroprudentially regulating is an illusion, what does that imply? There will be bubbles and there will be busts. Next time, however, will there be financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, asset managers, you name it) who are – or are perceived to be – “too big to fail”?

You cannot stop the tide and you cannot prevent financial crises. But you can limit the cost of those crises if your biggest players are small enough to fail.

It really all goes back to that. Hopefully the Administration is on the right track.