Crisis In Pakistan

Benazir Bhutto is under house arrest. With Nawaz Sharif out of the country, she is essentially the head of the pro-democracy movement. And she's been detained, with barbed wire going up around her house and thousands of her supporters arrested. The American reaction has been tepid.

The United States called for the restrictions on Bhutto to be lifted, saying it was "crucial for Pakistan's future that moderate political forces work together to bring Pakistan back on the path to democracy." A government spokesman promised she would be free by Saturday.

Bhutto twice tried to leave in her car on Friday, telling police: "Do not raise hands on women. You are Muslims. This is un-Islamic." They responded by blocking her way with an armored vehicle.

And this is perhaps the most classic reaction.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates, speaking to reporters earlier Friday on his plane en route home from a weeklong visit to Asia, said he was concerned Musharraf's emergency declaration and the protests and arrests that it spawned could affect operations in Afghanistan.

"The concern I have is that the longer the internal problems continue, the more distracted the Pakistani army and security services will be in terms of the internal situation rather than focusing on the terrorist threat in the frontier area," said Gates.

They have to fight our battles for us, don't they understand that?

In fact, the US could shut down this nonsense in a flash. But they may have given the go-ahead that no repercussions would come from imposing martial law, and all this focus on restoring elections (which are apparently reset for some time in the winter) neglects the fact that, if Musharraf doesn't restore democratic institutions like the courts, it will be child's play for him to rig the ballot boxes.

Musharraf's retention of the office of the president only would be a happy outcome for Washington too. The George W Bush administration is keen for him to give Pakistan a veneer of democracy by taking off his uniform, holding elections and renewing the interrupted partnership with Benazir Bhutto (whether Bhutto, facing her own political predicament, would consent for a second time is open to dispute).

Washington would not mind if the subsequent elections are rigged. American diplomats in Pakistan already have information about possible plans to ensure that Nawaz Sharif's faction of the Pakistan Muslim League will be denied victory irrespective of voting outcomes. Benazir's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q - that is, the pro-Musharraf faction in the ruling party) will then be allowed to battle against each other with the government intervening when this is to its advantage, leaving the leaders of these parties to fix the results themselves. For example, the Punjab regional government would ensure that certain constituency results produced enough seats in the national parliament to enable it to secure the prime ministerial position.

The United States has been showering Pakistan with aid for years, most of it in untraceable cash transfers that are supposed to be used for counterterrorism purposes, but relly could be used for anything. We are propping up a dictatorship, and as Joe Biden says, we need a new approach.

Beyond the current crisis lurks a far deeper problem. The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan is largely transactional -- and this transaction isn't working for either party. From America's perspective, we've spent billions of dollars on a bet that Pakistan's government would take the fight to the Taliban and Al Qaeda while putting the country back on the path to democracy. It has done neither [...]

We've got to move from a transactional relationship -- the exchange of aid for services -- to the normal, functional relationship we enjoy with all of our other military allies and friendly nations. We've got to move from a policy concentrated on one man -- President Musharraf -- to a policy centered on an entire people... the people of Pakistan. Like any major policy shift, to gain long-term benefits we'll have to shoulder short term costs. But given the stakes, those costs are worth it.

Here are the four elements of this new strategy.

First, triple non-security aid, to $1.5 billion annually. For at least a decade. This aid would be unconditioned: it's our pledge to the Pakistani people. Instead of funding military hardware, it would build schools, clinics, and roads.

Second, condition security aid on performance. We should base our security aid on clear results. We're now spending well over $1 billion annually, and it's not clear we're getting our money's worth. I'd spend more if we get better returns -- and less if we don't.

Third, help Pakistan enjoy a "democracy dividend." The first year of democratic rule should bring an additional $1 billion -- above the $1.5 billion non-security aid baseline. And I would tie future non-security aid -- again, above the guaranteed baseline -- to Pakistan's progress in developing democratic institutions and meeting good-governance norms.

Fourth, engage the Pakistani people, not just their rulers. This will involve everything from improved public diplomacy and educational exchanges to high impact projects that actually change people's lives.

Biden also smartly discussed returning to the fight for democracy in Afghanistan and immediately ceasing this nonsense about Iran as bulwarks to moderate Pakistanis that we actually mean what we say. Those, along with a hardline policy on lifting the martial law, using carrots and sticks, are the only way to get back to some equilibrium in this crisis point before it boils over.

UPDATE: Bhutto released, defiant.